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Introduction
For the past eight years, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has been utilized as an operational force but managed and resourced as a strategic reserve. The Department of Defense has defined the Reserve Components (RCs) operational role this way:
"The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services" force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed." 1 The manner in which the ARNG is currently manned, trained and equipped must be adapted to meet the requirements of an operational force to ensure that it is ready and available when needed.
Under the strategic reserve construct, the ARNG was mobilized for up to 18 months that provided time for units to cross-level personnel and fix readiness issues prior to deployment. As an operational force, the ARNG does not have the luxury of months to prepare its soldiers for deployment. Instead, units must be ready to react immediately to domestic situations or for wartime deployments on relatively short notice. It is critical that the ARNG maintain units at the highest level of personnel readiness in order to provide the forces required at the time needed to be an effective operational force. 
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Manning is the foundation of an operational force. If the force is not properly manned, units cannot effectively train at the collective level to prepare for missions, employ their equipment, or properly execute assigned tasks. In this regard, General Casey in a letter to Lieutenant General Blum stated: "Our goal is to achieve full spectrum readiness for ARNG units and full deployment readiness on mobilization. I would like you to outline the systemic policy changes needed to enable Guard units to achieve and maintain P1 personnel readiness standards during pre-mobilization…" 2 This paper examines the major personnel issues that have had an impact on the personnel readiness of the ARNG and provide some implementable recommendations in order to help achieve the personnel readiness required of an operational force. First, the ARNG must ensure that the organization continues to maintain more end strength than force structure. Next, it is critical that a Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Student (TTHS) account be established for the ARNG to prevent units from being manned with soldiers who cannot meet deployment requirements while the training backlog for non-prior service recruits is reduced to a more manageable timeframe.
Finally, the ARNG must build readiness as early as possible in the Army Force Generation Model by focusing efforts on medical and dental readiness plus recruiting and retention to allow units to stabilize the force that is deploying in a timely manner to provide the commander the ability to conduct effective collective training prior to entering the available phase which results in formations requiring less time at the mobilization station and more boots on the ground time. Guard soldiers expected to train one weekend a month, conduct a 15 day annual training period, and possibly participate in an exercise. The probability of a unit being alerted and deployed for an extended period in support of a wartime mission was very unlikely.
Since the global campaign against terrorism and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) began in 2001, the ARNG has maintained an incredible operational tempo for which they were neither designed nor resourced. The demand for ground forces to meet global commitments has grown to exceed the sustainable supply. This has resulted in the Army, including the ARNG, being "out of balance". This is the first protracted conflict that the Unites States is engaged in with an allvolunteer force and without a draft. Currently, the AC is less than 40 percent of its size 35 years ago and many of the Army's key capabilities reside in the reserve component.
The United States Army Reserve (USAR) and the Army National Guard contain 42 4 percent of the Army's combat forces, 66 percent of the Army's combat support forces, and 71 percent of the Army's combat service support forces.
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By necessity, the Army National Guard has become an integral part of the Army"s operational capability. The Army National Guard"s current design as a strategic reserve to meet the Cold War era threat does not support the requirements of today"s or the future operating environment. To meet the security demands of the 21 st Century, the Army National Guard must be resourced as an integral part of the Army"s strategic plan to be able to respond to the Nation"s call. As an operational force, the Army National
Guard should provide capabilities across the full spectrum of operations and strategic depth to help defeat current and future threats to security, plus respond to a range of non-military contingencies.
Personnel readiness is the bedrock of an operational force. In order to provide trained and ready units when required, the ARNG must focus on policies and processes that will allow units to achieve and maintain the highest levels of personnel readiness while minimizing the necessity to cross-level personnel across formations. Crossleveling is the process of reassigning personnel and equipment from units that are not deploying to formations that are preparing to deploy in order to increase the gaining unit"s personnel and equipment readiness levels to those required for the successful execution of the mission.
Deployment Impact on Personnel Readiness
The systemic challenges caused by over-structure, under-manning, and lack of a Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students account forced the ARNG to cross-level personnel in order to provide the operational Army formations that were 100 percent 3 ARNG G-3, Army National Guard Force Structure Percentages (Arlington, VA, 2010).
5 manned after 9/11. As a strategic reserve, the ARNG was never expected or resourced for cyclic deployment. Under a decidedly Cold War model, the ARNG was expected to fully mobilize for one time use in a general war. Therefore, cross-leveling personnel would not negatively impact a donor unit"s readiness. The pace of guard mobilizations and the stress of cyclic deployment resulted in the rapid decline of personnel readiness because of the continuous need to cross-level personnel between units.
Each additional deployment of an ARNG formation that required cross-leveling decreased the non-deployed donor"s readiness. The degree to which it did so depended on the extent of the cross-leveling necessary. Cross-leveling not only negatively impacts a donor unit"s personnel readiness but can also negatively impact the unit cohesion and training readiness of gaining organizations. Implementing solutions to improve readiness of ARNG units will greatly reduce the amount of crossleveling required to prepare units for deployment and lessen the negative readiness impact on donor units.
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This imbalance between the force structure allowance and total end strength ensures that individual ARNG units cannot be fully manned at home station. Notably, for the first time in recent history, the ARNG has maintained a positive balance between end strength and the force structure allowance from January 2008 to the present. The ARNG achieved this by rebalancing its formations to provide the capability required by the Active Army and eliminating unnecessary force structure from its organization.
Previously, even if the ARNG was manned at 100 percent of end strength, it would still have to cross-level personnel because of being authorized more force structure than people to fill the spaces. With the force structure-end strength imbalance corrected, the next major force structure issue to address is building an ARNG Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Student (TTHS) account.
The need for a Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) Account
To respond to its changed status from a strategic reserve to an operational force, the ARNG has had to cross-level personnel across formations and states in order to provide trained and ready units that are postured to accomplish real world combat missions. To soldiers that are either not available or unqualified will still be assigned to deployable units, creating the impression that these units are fully manned and ready.
Two factors compound the issue of assigning non-prior service soldiers directly to a unit instead of a TTHS account. First, the recruiting mix of the ARNG has dramatically changed over the last ten years. Now ARNG units recruit more non-prior service personnel than prior service accessions. from deployment with the organization. In addition, a prior service soldier that is qualified and deployable cannot be recruited to the unit since a position vacancy does not exist. This lack of TTHS "slack" severely handicaps the ARNG ability to achieve the readiness required of an operational force.
Creating a TTHS Account in the ARNG There are three viable courses of action open to the ARNG for establishing a functional TTHS account. The first course of action is creating a TTHS account via an increase in the end strength. By doing this, the ARNG will be able to continue to provide the capability required to support the national military objectives, provide units that are truly operational, and decrease the stress on the all-volunteer force. This will be a political challenge at a time of tight budgets in the active force, but no action will result in further stress on the reserve component and decline in operational readiness.
The second option is to decrease the current ARNG force structure allowance to form the TTHS account. A reduction in the ARNG force structure allowance will degrade the ARNG ability to respond to state and federal missions, decrease dwell time for units, and increase the stress on the force. The final course of action is to establish the TTHS by both increasing the end strength and decreasing the force structure allowance.
Although not as severe, the impacts would be similar to establishing the TTHS account by decreasing the ARNG force structure allowance.
The time is now right for a TTHS account for the ARNG because units have the proper framework to truly achieve the readiness levels to transform to an operational force. Although the method of creating a TTHS account for the ARNG should be debated, the ARNG must institute a TTHS account to be able to achieve the necessary A unit moves through the train/ready force pools as it prepares for future missions and conducts collective training. When a unit is ready to deploy again, they are assigned to the available pool. The key for ARNG units is to achieve the highest level of personnel readiness early in the train/ready force pool in order to allow the unit to conduct effective collective training prior to entering the available pool.
A formation must be properly stabilized prior to entering the collective training phase to ensure the personnel training are the personnel deploying. Medical and dental issues associated with deployment must be identified early to provide the unit enough time to correct the problems before moving too far into the train/ready phase. By building personnel readiness early, cross-leveling from other units to fill formations in the available pool will be minimized, collective training will be more effective and efficient, and unit cohesion will remain intact.
A Key Issue -Improving Medical/Dental Readiness
Medical and dental readiness must be addressed early in the Army Force Generation Model to positively impact the readiness of a unit prior to mobilization. The
Unit Status Report (USR) and the Medical Protection System (MEDPROS) are two excellent tools that provide the readiness status of units as they flow through ARFORGEN. Leaders at all levels must emphasize the importance of personnel readiness and make it a priority. If a unit cannot deploy with the personnel it is training, the time devoted to training is irrelevant.
In February 2007, the Department of Defense implemented the 12 month mobilization policy which has forced units to address medical and dental readiness at home-station in order to maximize collective training at the mobilization station. 11 Prior to the 12 month mobilization policy units did not focus on personnel readiness prior to reaching the mobilization station. A unit expected to have all its medical and dental issues corrected at the mobilization station which resulted in an organization spending up to 6 months at the mobilization site before deploying.
Corrective medical and dental treatment at mobilization stations is often more expensive, reduces training time, and may necessitate treatment short-cuts which could create issues during deployment. 12 Furthermore, treatment at mobilization stations does not catch Class 3 and 4 personnel cross-leveled into units until after mobilization.
Individuals cross-leveled to fill gaps are typically only 50 percent dentally ready because they have not been on alert nor have they been receiving needed treatment. 13 Crossleveled soldiers that need treatment due to medical or dental issues miss valuable training time which negatively impacts the cohesion and integration of the new soldiers into the deploying unit. mobilization standards without additional care at the mobilization station. The cornerstone of improving dental readiness across the force is to provide dental exams and treatment outside of alert and throughout the Army Force Generation Cycle. In conjunction with providing dental care early, the ARNG must leverage the dental benefits available during demobilization and increase the capability of the ARNG Dental
Corps.
The Army Select Reserve Dental Readiness System (ASDRS) will enable states to provide dental treatment to soldiers through local contracts or utilizing the Tri-service
Reserve Health Readiness Program (RHRP). 16 The ASDRS would use existing authority to provide care to members of the reserve not on alert, by referring reserve component soldiers to civilian providers through the RHRP. The ASDRS will also track dental readiness of alert status and remind soldiers about appointments. 16 grace period to allow soldiers 180 days to obtain a dental exam before reverting to a class 4 status (unknown), instead of the previous 90 day limit.
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The ARNG Dental Corps provides the states and territories the capability to internally provide dental exams and basic care to its soldiers. Currently, the ARNG Dental Corps is less than 60 percent strength, with the majority of remaining dentist being retirement eligible. The current retirement age of the National Guard medical and dental corps is 64 while the other three components the retirement age is 68. 25 The increase of the retirement age to 68 would allow the ARNG to retain the majority of dental corps while trying to increase the dental corps strength. Without a fully manned dental corps, the leadership of the ARNG will have difficulty accurately determining the dental readiness of organizations, conduct essential pre-deployment dental exams, and providing basic dental care.
Providing two medical readiness days per year would add incentive for the solider to complete readiness requirements. This would further improve overall unit readiness by removing medical readiness days as a competitor for training days. This would also allow units to go on active duty to seek medical/dental treatment without loss of income from civilian employers. These medical readiness days are transferable and can be polled between soldiers within a unit, depending on the need of extended treatment of the other soldiers in the unit.
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The ARNG has identified and implemented many programs to improve medical and dental readiness. States have been focusing on dental readiness and have been increasingly high dental readiness rate of over 90 percent. This can be illustrated with the 39 th BCT from Arkansas which was 92 percent dentally ready in January 2008, compared to October 2003 when the average was 13 percent dental readiness in the same unit. 27 The policies, procedures, and resources focused on improving personnel readiness to prepare brigade combat teams for deployment should be modeled and applied to the force as a whole. States are given a number of options by the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to improve medical and dental health. Treatment programs are tailored to meet specific unit needs, using a variety of different programs, and are eligible for funding from the NGB. 28 The Department of Defense is making large investments to the health of the force by providing many options to soldiers for medical and dental care. In return, the ARNG should hold soldiers accountable to be deployable as a condition of service. The improvement of medical and dental readiness in the ARNG has allowed commanders to recoup the time lost to treatment and enable them to focus on collective training and maximize the boots-on-the-ground time in-theater.
Recruiting and Retention
Prior These goals were met with the assistance from state leaders focused on endstrength by placing some soldiers into duty statuses that better describe them, including enlisted soldiers with expired terms, non-validated pay, or no training seat reservation. 35 A limited number of recruiters also carried out increasingly efficient and precise "targeted recruiting". They focused on specific skills which were tailored to the adjusted force and its skill shortages. The National Guard Bureau was in touch with state and local recruiters to consult on which recruiting programs should be bolstered or more strongly utilized. According to Major General Ray Carpenter, the ARNG was required to The ARNG had a total strength of 358,442 in February 2010. Over 4,000 were recruited in January 2010, surpassing set goals. Retention numbers were reported at 124 percent of the assigned mission, with over 3,115 soldiers retained. 37 Because of the success in recruiting and retention, medical and bad conduct waivers will no longer be granted to new enlistees and the maximum enlistment age has changed from 42 to 35, greatly improving the quality of the force. 38 Another benefit experienced is the age of the force. Because the ARNG has been replacing 20 percent of its force every year, the ARNG is the youngest it has been since the end of the draft nearly 40 years ago, resulting in less health issues as experienced with an older force.
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The ARNG has made unprecedented gains in strength by leveraging the strong points of the organization and implementing creative ways to recruit and retain soldiers.
The ARNG has grown a force that is younger and more capable than at any time in the history of the National Guard. It is an amazing accomplishment considering all this was achieved during a period of conflict.
Conclusion
In order to meet the post-9/11 requirement for ground forces around the world, the ARNG has transformed itself from a "strategic reserve" to an "operational force". During the 1990"s, DoD assumed significant readiness risk by underfunding the ARNG resulting in units that were not prepared for an operational role in which they found themselves. As a strategic reserve, DoD could afford to under resource the ARNG, ramping it up as necessary with the benefit of advanced warning. Over the past decade, long-term, cyclical global deployments have revealed the costs of this increased risk on operations, readiness and morale of the RC.
In order to ensure the ARNG can meet the current and future demands placed on its forces, the investment in personnel readiness must be a priority. To accomplish this, the leadership of the ARNG cannot allow the force to become hollow again by adding more force structure to the organization without having the personnel to fill the formations. A TTHS account must be implemented to ensure operational units are manned with only soldiers who are available for deployment, eliminating the false impression of ready units. The ARFORGEN process needs to require organizations to 39 Michael Dann, "How 9/11 Changed the National Guard." National Guard Bureau, September 5, 2006. 22 achieve higher levels of personnel readiness earlier in the cycle to guarantee units can effectively train at the collective level prior to entering the available force pool. Medical and dental issues should be addressed efficiently leveraging the programs implemented to provide care to soldiers. Soldiers should be provided medical readiness days to address issues and required to meet health requirements for deployment in order to be in good standing. The ARNG needs to maintain its current success in strength management to provide units with individuals who can meet the minimum requirements for deployment.
The ARNG must continue to make personnel readiness the highest priority in order to provide America with an effective organization that is able to supply a wide array of capabilities that can respond to domestic emergencies, contribute to homeland defense, and support overseas contingency operations when needed.
